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WHAT ARE THE FACTS OF MARE URY v. 
MADISON? 1 
Sanford Levinson2 and Jack M. Balkin3 
One of the most familiar features of the first year class in 
constitutional law, or indeed, in any first year subject, is the rit-
ual practice of asking young law students to state the facts of 
cases. Not surprisingly, one of the first cases that students often 
encounter4 in their study of constitutional law is Marbury v. 
Madison/ and so it is no surprise that Marbury presents one of 
the first opportunities for many law students to state the facts of 
a case.6 
This is both deeply appropriate and deeply ironic. It is ap-
propriate because Marbury is not just any case. It is a veritable 
1. This article grows out of comments delivered by Sanford Levinson at the gath-
ering convened at the University of Minnesota Law School by Michael Paulsen on Feb-
ruary 24, 2003, to celebrate the 200th birthday of Marbury v. Madison. The definite out-
lier at this gathering, he explained his reluctance to "celebrate" Marbury and, indeed, 
why it should basically disappear from the canon of cases taught to first-year students, an 
argument elaborated in Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except to 
Eastern Europeans) and Why You Shouldn't Either, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553 
(2003). Conveying his views to Balkin, the two struck up a conversation about the "facts" 
of Marbury, and the present essay is the result. 
2. W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Regents Chair in Law, Uni-
versity of Texas Law School. 
3. Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law 
School. 
4. Though not in Levinson's course, see Levinson, supra note 1. 
5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
6. As a matter of fact, Balkin rarely asks students to state the facts in Marbury 
because he feels that having students work through the procedural history of the case is 
largely a waste of time, given that there are so many more pressing issues that students 
need to be exposed to in an introductory course on Constitutional Law. One need not be 
a devotee of Chicago economics to realize that both law professors and their students are 
trapped in an economy of scarcity that gets worse every year as the volume of constitu-
tional opinions and other relevant materials increase. So, as a result, both Balkin and 
Levinson usually offer a brief synopsis of what they believe to be the relevant facts of a 
given case and then plunge straight into the discussion about their legal implications. 
With regard to Marbury, however, Levinson's position is more complex. As indicated 
above, supra note 1, he generally does not teach the case at all. When he has taught it at 
an American law school, he has interrogated students at some length about the facts, 
precisely in order to demonstrate the ambiguities that are the subject of this essay. 
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symbol of judicial independence and of commitment to the Rule 
of Law, the hallmarks, most lawyers believe, of the United States 
Constitution. Moreover, allowing first-year students to work 
through the procedural history of the case and to parse Mar-
shall's complicated reading of both the Judiciary Act of 1789 and 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution is a professional rite of pas-
sage that allows students to feel that they are mastering impor-
tant legal concepts and difficult legal texts in the way that "real" 
lawyers do. 
Yet asking students to recite the facts of Marbury at the be-
ginning of their legal careers is also deeply ironic. It is ironic be-
cause there is more than one way to state what happened in 
Marbury, and thus what constitute its "facts." Depending on 
what one thinks the facts of Marbury are, the case is either, on 
the one hand, a symbol of judicial independence and the separa-
tion of law from politics, or, on the other, a revealing case study 
in the inevitable influence of politics on judicial decisionmaking 
that demonstrates the inability of courts fully to separate law 
from politics even as they repeatedly attempt to disguise this fact 
in their own judicial rhetoric. 
The "traditional" recitation of the facts of Marbury looks 
something like this: John Adams appointed William Marbury to 
be a Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia, and his 
commission had been signed by the relevant federal official (in 
this instance, of course, John Marshall himself, acting in his ca-
pacity as Secretary of State in the outgoing Adams Administra-
tion). Nevertheless, the new Secretary of State, James Madison, 
refused to deliver the signed commission to Mr. Marbury. Mar-
bury had therefore filed suit before the Supreme Court invoking 
its original jurisdiction and asking for a writ of mandamus order-
ing that Madison convey to him what was rightfully his, the 
commission that would entitle him to take the office to which he 
had been appointed by the President of the United States. 
This accounting of the facts of Marbury is fully adequate if 
one draws the facts from the official reports of the case itself. 
Alas, it tells us nothing about why Marbury was a significant case 
in its own time. Perhaps more to the point, it does not enable us 
to understand why the legal arguments that Marshall offers in 
the case are so strained and peculiar. 
If a student in a law school class had articulated the facts set 
out above, we might ask her why Madison was withholding the 
commission, whether he was acting out of simple pettiness, per-
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sonal dislike of William Marbury, or some other reason. If the 
student had majored in American history before entering law 
school, she might give a very different answer to the question of 
what the facts of Marbury are, an answer that might look some-
thing like this: 
The case arose out of a dispute between two political parties 
in the United States, the Federalists, led primarily by Alexander 
Hamilton (though John Adams in fact succeeded to the presi-
dency as the Federalist candidate following Washington), and 
the Republicans, led by Thomas Jefferson, Aaron Burr and 
James Madison. This dispute was particularly important in form-
ing the conditions of democracy in the young republic. The 
Framers of the 1787 Constitution did not think there would or 
should be political parties. They identified political parties with 
factions, which were dangerous to the health of democratic insti-
tutions. They designed a Constitution that was supposed to work 
without the creation of such factions or, at worst, would prevent 
their growth and baleful influence. Nevertheless, within a few 
years of the ratification of the Constitution, political parties 
quickly appeared, and the contest between them quickly became 
quite bitter. Matters only got worse in 1796, when the Republi-
can Thomas Jefferson became Vice President under the Federal-
ist President, John Adams, because the electoral college 
awarded the Vice-Presidency to the person who came in second 
in the balloting for the presidency (assuming that the winner re-
ceived the majority of the electoral vote). The Republicans fi-
nally won control of the Presidency in 1800, when Jefferson de-
feated Adams, although the election was contested because 
Jefferson and his running mate Aaron Burr got equal numbers 
of electoral votes, and the election was thrown into the House of 
Representatives. 
The election of 1800 posed a real crisis for the fledgling de-
mocracy. It was by no means clear that the transfer of power 
from the old revolutionary party, the Federalists, to the upstart 
Republicans would work or could be achieved peacefully. The 
Federalists did not trust the new Republican party at all. Believ-
ing that the Republicans would be a disaster for the United 
States, they were willing to do almost anything to stave off a Jef-
fersonian takeover of the country. 
Because of a quirk in the way that the Constitution struc-
tured the timetable for elections, the incoming Republican-
controlled Congress would not take office until almost half a 
year after the elections, and most importantly, after the lame 
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duck House of Representatives had chosen the new President. 
This odd feature of the constitutional system also reflected the 
naive notion that there would not be political parties, but rather 
simply one selection of "the best men" following another. Thus, 
the Federalists continued to control Congress through March 
3rd, 1801, even though they had been repudiated in the polls. 
They were busy indeed; prior to breaking the Jefferson-Burr 
deadlock, they acted to stock the federal courts with as many of 
their allies as possible by passing, on February 13th, the Judici-
ary Act of 1801, establishing a host of new judicial offices to 
which Federalists could be appointed. (Historians sympathetic to 
the Jeffersonian cause usually label these appointees the "mid-
night judges.") The Federalist Secretary of State, John Marshall, 
was appointed Chief Justice, though he continued to act as Sec-
retary of State up to the last minute before Jefferson's inaugura-
tion (and Madison's occupancy of the office). Thus Marshall 
himself signed William Marbury's commission as a Justice of the 
Peace in the District of Columbia. 
Marbury's commission, however, was a mere sideshow to a 
much more crucial struggle. Far, far more important than the 
relatively trivial commissions for Justices of the Peace were the 
new federal appellate judges appointed by Adams under the au-
thority of the Judiciary Act of 1801. The Act established a new 
set of courts (and judges) to complement the District and Su-
preme Court judges who had, prior to its passage, comprised the 
federal judiciary. The purported justification of the creation of 
circuit judges was to relieve the Supreme Court Justices of the 
onerous duty of riding circuit from place to place. But the Re-
publicans felt that the real reason was to further entrench Feder-
alist control over the judiciary. 
The Republicans believed that the Midnight Judges Act was 
deeply unfair, not least because the Act had been passed-and 
the new judges it authorized were appointed and confirmed-
during a lame duck session. All of this was done in open defiance 
of the fact that the Republicans had just succeeded in securing 
popular approval for their new political party and in repudiating 
the leadership of Adams and his Federalist associates. Acting 
under the orders of President Jefferson, newly installed Republi-
can Secretary of State James Madison refused to deliver Mar-
bury's commission to him. But the new circuit judges had al-
ready taken office. So the members of the Republican-controlled 
Congress employed a different strategy: They engaged in a 
wholesale purge of these new Federalist judges by repealing the 
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Judiciary Act of 1801 in 1802, and, therefore, eliminating the ju-
dicial offices occupied by the circuit judges. The Repeal Act was 
passed on March 8, 1802;7 seven weeks later, on April 29, Con-
gress passed the Judiciary Act of 1802,8 which, among other 
things, reassigned the Supreme Court Justices to their previous 
role as circuit judges. 
The Jeffersonians recognized that the Federalist-controlled 
Supreme Court might strike back at their purge by declaring the 
repeal of the Judiciary Act unconstitutional. So the Judiciary Act 
of 1802 made a preemptive strike by eliminating the Supreme 
Court's 1802 Term and staving off the next session of the Court 
until February of 1803. That is why Marbury v. Madison was de-
cided in· 1803 rather than 1802. The clear import of this shot 
across the bow was that if the Federalist Justices made decisions 
that the Republican Congress did not like, the Justices might be 
removed as well, perhaps through impeachment. Indeed, the 
Republicans did impeach the Federalist Justice Samuel Chase. 
Chase was later acquitted, but not before the Marbury case was 
heard and decided in 1803. At the point that Marshall and his 
colleagues heard the case, the threat against them was real and 
palpable. 
In fact, a challenge to the repeal of the Judiciary Act was 
brewing in the federal courts at the very same time as Marbury. 
That case, Stuart v. Laird, 9 challenged the constitutionality of the 
Jeffersonian purge by challenging Congress's ability to require 
Supreme Court Justices to resume their duties as circuit judges.10 
The petitioners in Stuart argued that the Justices of the Su-
preme Court held commissions to be Supreme Court Justices, 
but not circuit judges.11 Hence they could not sit as circuit judges 
once the positions held by the new circuit judges were abolished. 
In addition, the repeal of the circuit judgeships was unconstitu-
tional because according to Article Ill of the Constitution, once 
they had received their commissions, the circuit judges had life 
tenure. Allowing Congress to abolish the courts undermined ju-
dicial independenceY A third argument seemed to follow from 
7. Act of March 8, 1802,2 Stat. 132. 
8. 2 Stat. 156. 
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
10. See GEORGE L HASKil'iS AND HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. 2, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN 
MARSHALL, 1801-1815 at 180 (1981). 
1 L !d. at 299. 
12. !d. 
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the structural aspects of Marshall's own decision in Marbury v. 
Madison, which argued that Congress could not add to the 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because, by piling on 
added duties, Congress could swamp the Court and prevent it 
from playing its central role as constitutional adjudicator.13 In 
like fashion, petitioners argued that Congress could not bestow 
upon the Supreme Court justices additional duties as circuit jus-
tices in nisi prius courts (courts of first instance) because this was 
in fact-and not merely in theory-a major burden on members 
of the Supreme Court. 
Chief Justice John Marshall, sitting as a circuit judge, had 
delivered the lower court opinion in Stuart v. Laird, rejecting the 
petitioners' arguments. For reasons that are unclear, he recused 
himself from sitting on the appeal to the Supreme Court.14 (In 
the early days of the Republic wheri Justices rode circuit, it was 
common for them to sit in on appeals of their own decisions, just 
as members of circuit courts today normally do not recuse them-
selves when a decision they participated in is appealed to the full 
court en bane.). The juxtaposition of Marshall's recusal in Stuart 
v. Laird with his notable failure to recuse himself in Marbury v. 
Madison is particularly striking, given that Marshall was the Sec-
retary of State whose failure to deliver Marbury's commission in 
a timely fashion in the first place gave rise to the litigation in 
Marbury. In any case, as a result of Marshall's recusal, Stuart v. 
Laird is the rare example of a major Supreme Court decision15 
that Marshall did not write during his tenure as Chief Justice; it 
was written instead by Justice Paterson. 
Paterson made short work of the petitioners' claims in Stu-
art v. Laird. He did not in fact directly address the question 
whether the abolition of the circuit judgeships violated the life 
tenure provisions of Article III, perhaps because none of the 
judges actually affected chose to litigate the issue. (To this ex-
tent, it may be a misnomer to describe it as a "constitutional 
case," though, to put it mildly, it was treated as having constitu-
tive importance with regard to the ability of Congress to elimi-
nate part of the federal judiciary.) Instead he merely held that 
13. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1370 (2003). 
14. 5 U.S. at 308. 
15. Though the word "major" is our assessment, not that of the current constitu-
tional canon. Stuart v. Laird was a "major" case because of its crucial consequences for 
the political stability of the country in the early years of the Republic. It is distinctly "mi-
nor," however, if one measures it either by its length-it consists of four paragraphs that 
take up a scant page-and-a-half of text-or by the fact that Justice Paterson scarcely ad-
dresses the most profound issues raised by the repeal of the Judiciary Act. 
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the transfer of the case from a circuit court established by the 
now-repealed Judiciary Act of 1801, to a reconstructed circuit 
court, re-established by the 1802 Act, that included a Supreme 
Court justice riding circuit (in this case, John Marshall himself) 
presented no constitutional problems. The previous practice of 
having Supreme Court Justices sit on circuit, contemporaneous 
with the very beginnings of the federal judicial system, Paterson 
argued, had settled the question of constitutionality, "and ought 
not now to be disturbed."16 
In terms of its viability as an institution, what the Supreme 
Court did in Stuart was every bit as important as what it did in 
Marbury, and probably more so. A week after the decision in 
Marbury, holding that the Federalist William Marbury would 
not get his commission, the Court handed down its decision in 
Stuart, upholding de facto the constitutionality of the repeal of 
the Judiciary Act and allowing the Jeffersonians to purge the 
new Federalist circuit judges. As Bruce Ackerman has convinc-
ingly argued in an as yet unpublished manuscript, 17 Stuart is far 
more significant than Marbury inasmuch as it represents the full 
capitulation by the Supreme Court to the new political reality of 
Jeffersonian hegemony. Read in light of Stuart v. Laird, Marbury 
suggests that the Supreme Court clearly responded to the politi-
cal pressure of the times. The Court stated in dicta that Mar-
bury's rights were violated by the Jeffersonians and that he was 
entitled to his commission. Nevertheless, it held as a matter of 
law that Marbury could not get his commission because the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789 (if read to allow grants of mandamus) was un-
constitutional. Finally, it also suggested in Stuart v. Laird that 
the Jeffersonians could eliminate the circuit judgeships created 
by the Federalist Party. The upshot of the two opinions, taken 
together, is striking: While holding unconstitutional a relatively 
unimportant feature of the 1789 Judiciary Act through a strained 
and remarkably unpersuasive interpretation of both the Act and 
Article III of the Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall and his 
colleagues upheld the constitutionality of the far more important 
16. Paterson argued: 
To this objection, which is of recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that practice 
and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the 
organization of the judicial system, afford an irresistible answer, and has indeed 
fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible 
nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or con· 
trolled. Of course, the question is at rest, and ought not now to be disturbed. 
!d. at 308. 
17. Bruce Ackerman, America on the Brink (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
authors). 
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1802 Repeal Act. In this way they gave the Jeffersonian purge 
the blessing of the law. 
Marbury is often thought of-and, indeed taught-as repre-
senting the grand notion of an independent judiciary devoted to 
the declaration and protection of constitutional rights by courts. 
It symbolizes the importance of the separation of law from poli-
tics and the central principle that it is the duty of the Supreme 
Court "to say what the law is," regardless of the political pres-
sures of the moment. This view is reinforced by accepting the 
facts as stated in the official reports. But when the second set of 
"facts" of Marbury is stated, the case takes on a very different 
meaning. Instead, it becomes abundantly clear that the origi-
nary18 and most famous exercise of judicial review in American 
history, Marbury v. Madison, was utterly shaped by partisan dis-
pute and by the federal judiciary's felt lack of independence 
from politics. Indeed, the relative independence of the federal 
judiciary was not established until after the Jeffersonians de-
cided not to remove Justice Chase, following the denial of Wil-
liam Marbury's commission in Marbury v. Madison and the Fed-
eralist Court's legitimation of the Repeal Act in Stuart v. Laird. 
Finally, Marbury seems to portray the role of an independ-
ent judiciary in a particularly unsavory light. The Court sepa-
rated right from remedy, stating that William Marbury was enti-
tled to his commission as Justice of the Peace, but refusing to 
enforce his rights because of the intervention of more powerful 
political forces not overtly mentioned in the opinion. Viewed 
18. At least in terms of the standard narrative, which often describes Marbury as 
"establishing" judicial review. As Mark Graber convincingly argues in Establishing Judi-
cial Review, Marbury and the Judiciary Act of 1789, 38 TULSA L. REV. 609 2003), it was 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 that "established" judicial review, and not Marbury, which sim-
ply illustrated it. And, as David Currie has shown with equal force, a number of pre-
Marbury cases can be understood only against the background assumption that the judi-
ciary did in fact have the power to invalidate a federal law at least under some condi-
tions. See DAVID CURRlE, 1 THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 37-51 (1985). 
See, e.g., Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796), which can be understood only on the 
assumption that the Court in fact possessed the power that we call judicial review. Thus, 
wrote Justice Chase, "Only one question is submitted to the opinion of this court; 
whether the law of Congress, of the 5th of June, 1794, entitled,' An act to lay duties upon 
carriages, for the conveyance of persons,' is unconstitutional and void?"' ld. at 172. The 
issue in Hylton concerned the arcane question of "direct taxes," as required by the Con-
stitution. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 4 ("No capitation, or other direct Tax, shall be 
laid, except in Proportion to the Census or enumeration herein directed to be taken"). 
The Court rejected the attack and held the tax constitutional. The main point, though, is 
that the Court suggested, fully seven years before Marbury (and five years before Mar-
shall's ascension to the Court) that it could have declared it "unconstitutional and void" 
had it been persuaded that the law violated the Constitution. 
2003] WHAT ARE THE FACTS OF MARBURY? 263 
from this perspective, Marbury is akin to Giles v. Harris/ 9 in 
which the Supreme Court, per Justice Holmes, stated that even if 
blacks had effectively been disenfranchised in the State of Ala-
bama in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, there was, as a 
practical matter, nothing that the Court could do to prevent it. 
One might object that all of these latter facts come from 
"outside" the case and that a student who gave only the first set 
of facts should hardly be condemned for failing to recite the sec-
ond set. After all, the operative assumption in most law school 
courses is that the question "What are the facts of X v. Y?" is an 
attempt to determine whether the student has in fact read the 
case as reported in the casebook and can offer an account of the 
cause of action and relevant procedural history based on the four 
corners of the judicial opinion as the casebook presents it. But 
our point, of course, is that one cannot possibly understand 
Marbury by remaining within the four corners of John Mar-
shall's opinion. Indeed, that opinion is written precisely to create 
the illusion that nothing else that was happening at the time had 
anything at all to do with the decision reached in the case. In-
stead, the Court was merely adhering to its sacred duty "to say 
what the law is," by carefully laying the text of the challenged 
statute-the Judiciary Act of 1789-next to the text of Article 
III of the Constitution and dispassionately considering whether 
the former text conflicts with the latter. That is the tone of Mar-
shall's rhetoric in Marbury, and only little features that poke out 
of the opinion- for example, that the case is decided in 1803 
rather than 1802-signal that larger political forces are at play, 
and that something besides a dispassionate heremeneutical exer-
cise is occurring within the pages of this text. 
In similar fashion, one cannot simply assert that the Jeffer-
sonian-Federalist controversy is irrelevant to the legal import of 
Marbury, for that begs the question of what the legal import of 
Marbury is.20 Does Marbury in fact establish that it is the duty of 
the courts unflinchingly "to say what the law is," or rather does it 
establish something quite different about the pragmatic role of 
courts in a democratic society? One can insist that the political 
19. 189 U.S. 475 (1903). For an excellent commentary on the importance of Giles, 
see Richard Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 
295 (2000). 
20. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind· A Bicentennial 
Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2003) for an excellent 
treatment of the potentially different (and contradictory) messages conveyed by Mar-
bury. 
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dispute that gives rise to Marbury (and to Stuart v. Laird) is ir-
relevant to its legal import only by focusing doggedly and my-
opically on what the Legal Realists famously called "law on the 
books" as opposed to the "law in action." 
The puzzle of what exactly are "the facts" of Marbury v. 
Madison is merely an example of a more general puzzle about 
what it means for a student to recite the facts of any legal case. It 
will not do, for example, to insist that the only proper facts of the 
case are those that can be gleaned from reading the text written 
by the court, while excluding "outside" facts, derived from one's 
knowledge of not only the immediate circumstances surrounding 
the case but also the history of the controversy that gives rise to 
it. Much legal pedagogy is directed at getting students to under-
stand that there is more to understanding the facts relevant to 
decision than what judges reveal in their opinions. 
It is well known, for example, that appellate opinions often 
hold certain facts to be true that are not true, either because of 
pleading rules that take certain facts as settled for purposes of 
deciding procedural motions, or, more troublingly, because ju-
rists tend to "fudge" facts, spinning them in one way or another 
in order to make the reasoning that follows appear inevitable. It 
is also well known that jurists sometimes omit otherwise relevant 
facts that would prove embarrassing to the legal doctrines they 
favor,21 while taking judicial notice of other facts not in the re-
cord that tend to make their arguments appear more convinc-
ing?2 Indeed, and perhaps of equal relevance, it is well known 
that litigating lawyers routinely redescribe the relevant facts to 
21. For example, one would never learn from Justice Holmes' opinion in Debs v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) who Eugene V. Debs was. Sentencing him to jail for 
interfering with the draft by speaking out against World War I seems particularly prob-
lematic when it is recognized that Debs was a former (and future) Presidential candidate 
who had won over a million votes in the 1912 election, for, among other things, opposing 
American militarism as a particularly egregious and unhealthy side effect of runaway 
capitalism. 
22. In Marbury v. Madison itself, Chief Justice Marshall takes judicial notice of the 
fact that Marbury's commission was signed and sealed by the Secretary of State. His 
brother James Marshall's affidavit in the case does not affirm that Marbury's was among 
the commissions scheduled for delivery, only that he believed it might have been. 5 U.S. 
at 146. Of course, the reason why Marshall could take judicial notice of these crucial facts 
for Marbury's case was that he was the Secretary of State who personally affixed the 
Great Seal of the United States to Marbury's commission. Of course, this simply raises 
even more urgently the question why Marshall was not compelled to recuse himself in 
the case. His failure to do so speaks volumes about what we might mean by the "inde-
pendent judiciary" that Marbury v. Madison is supposed to symbolize. Indeed, the more 
we learn about the facts of Marbury, the more we are likely to conclude that Marbury 
symbolizes precisely the opposite phenomenon. 
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suit their client's interests in the "statement of the facts" that 
appears in lawyers' briefs.23 Lawyers, whether as practicing at-
torneys or judges, have been post-modernists avant le lettre in-
asmuch as the "facts" they have offered to juries, judges, and 
other legal decisionmakers were always self-conscious construc-
tions in the service of a particular agenda. 
In fact, there is no natural dividing point that demarcates 
the "facts of the case" from what one might want to dismiss as 
factual "irrelevancies." Rather, the articulation of the "facts of 
the case" is always pragmatic and provisional. It is a way of di-
viding up social reality into the legally relevant and non-relevant 
that serves a particular set of purposes. In the case of the peda-
gogy of the legal academy, those purposes are the socialization 
of law students into the legal profession and the separation of 
law (and what lawyers do) from politics. 
A basic feature of the socialization process in legal educa-
tion-particularly during the first year-is to teach students what 
counts as a "correct" statement of the facts, which forms part of 
teaching them to "think like lawyers." They learn to demarcate 
that which is of particularly "legal concern" from that which is 
not relevant in the eyes of the law, either because it is of merely 
historical interest, because it is normatively irrelevant, or, per-
haps most importantly, because it is a question of politics that 
must be separated from the legal rule of the case. That is be-
cause the legal rule of the case is, by stipulation, separate from 
politics, ideology, policy goals and personal predelictions and 
therefore must be able to be stated and applied without refer-
ence to such ends. 
Thus, learning how to recite "the facts of a case" to the sat-
isfaction of a law professor is an essential part of disciplining 
students, in the fullest sense of that word.24 Identifying the le-
gally relevant facts and spurning those that are not relevant to 
law and legal argument is a disciplinary method of separating 
law from politics, instilled from the first day of professional in-
culcation and imbibed like mother's milk. In this way beginning 
law students learn to reorient their normative imaginations 
around the structure of the standard form appellate opinion and 
its implicit separation of the legally germane from that which is 
23. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Getting Serious About 'Taking Le-
gal Reasoning Seriously,' 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 543,545-46 (1999). 
24. See id. at 558. See also J.M. Balkin, lnterdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 949,952-57 (1996). 
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irrelevant in the eyes of the law, or to put it another way, that 
which the law must not see or at least pretend not to see in order 
to remain "the law." Through this discipline one learns to know 
and not know what surrounds a case, to see and not to see the 
premises that give rise to the legal dispute. In this respect Mar-
bury v. Madison is the perfect example of the appellate opinion, 
a decision framed and directed by circumstances it cannot admit 
to while retaining its authority as law, engaged in legal reasoning 
whose peculiar features are shaped by forces it cannot mention 
to its audience. 
Learning how to recite the facts of a case is crucial because 
it involves both the separation of law and politics and the honing 
of analytical skills, and equally important, because it leaves the 
lasting impression in the student's mind that the two enterprises 
are necessarily correlated. Nothing is more central to the ideo-
logical mission of the traditional American law school than to 
persuade students that "legal" analysis is a fundamentally differ-
ent enterprise from policy analysis and, therefore, that judicial 
interpretations of what the Constitution commands are notably 
different from the imposition of political preferences, whether 
"high" or "low."25 Separating out the normatively relevant from 
the normatively irrelevant is the very definition of legal rigor, 
which distinguishes a finely honed legal mind from fuzzy, mud-
dleheaded thinking. It also serves to define the sorts of consid-
erations that lawyers and judges are permitted to make in decid-
ing cases according to law rather than in some other way. Here 
too, Marbury is exquisitely appropriate as an introduction to the 
legal canon, for its formalist rhetoric repeatedly directs the stu-
dent's attention away from the very features of politics that ex-
plain and determine its choice of formalisms. 
The boundaries of the legally relevant and the legally non-
relevant, however, are hardly fixed. They are always subject to 
further dispute even when one assumes a law that is relatively 
autonomous from politics. If a student begins a discussion of the 
facts of, say, the famous tort case of Palsgrafv. Long Island Rail-
road,26 by pointing out that Helen Palsgraf had brown hair, or 
blonde, most professors will likely give the student the law 
school equivalent of a rap on the knuckles. That is because most 
people would agree that Mrs. Palsgraf's hair color is not norma-
25. For the distinction between the "high" politics of larger political principles and 
the low" politics of partisan advantage, see J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Under-
standing the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1060-1064 (2002). 
26. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
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tively relevant to the rule of the case, the circumstances under 
which a duty of care is owed to people in causally complicated 
accidents. Nevertheless, if the student states that Mrs. Paslgraf 
was a poor woman with children to support,27 the question then 
arises whether the poverty of a tort plaintiff should have any 
relevance to the rule of law that applies to her, or, more gener-
ally, whether tort rules should be adopted based on their likely 
distributive consequences. And even if we think that legal rules 
should not turn on the financial circumstances of individual 
plaintiffs like Mrs. Palsgraf, we still might ask whether the sort of 
accident that she fell victim to is of a kind likely to happen to 
one or another class of persons. Our notion of what facts are le-
gally salient will shift based on the sorts of legal rules we are 
willing to consider as properly applying to the case. 
Even so, one might object, the inevitable flexibility that we 
will encounter in deciding what facts are legally relevant does 
not mean that "anything goes" and that the "facts" of Marbury 
must necessarily include the entire political history we have just 
outlined. All our example demonstrates is that the relevant 
"facts" of a case depend on their saliency to a proposed choice of 
legal rule and its application to those facts. That is to say, the 
"facts" of a case are those necessary for the law student to de-
cide whether the legal rule is fair and/or whether the case is cor-
rectly or incorrectly decided. So, in the case of Marbury, the 
"facts" of Marbury are those facts necessary to determine 
whether the case appeared before the Court in a procedurally 
correct fashion, the facts necessary to decide which rule is most 
appropriate, and the facts necessary to decide what the best ap-
plication of that rule to the situation before the Court would be. 
In short, the facts of the case are those facts necessary to deter-
mine whether the legal decision the Court reached is lawful, fair 
and just. 
But when we apply this criterion to constitutional cases, its 
boundaries quickly become quite complicated. Consider Mar-
bury as an example. Assuming that one of the key questions in-
volved in Marbury is the proper scope and extent of judicial re-
view of Congressional action, why shouldn't all of the historical 
facts about the political milieu that we have just recited count? 
After all, in deciding the proper scope of judicial review, isn't it 
27. See, e.g., JOHN NOONAN, THE PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 114, 125, 142 
(1976) (references to Helen Palsgrars income). Judge Noonan discusses Cardozo's excis-
ing of any references to Palsgrars personal characteristics at 134-39 and the fact that she 
was a mother at 141. 
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relevant how much we can expect the judiciary truly to be inde-
pendent of politics, including both political pressures from out-
side the courts and the political values and allegiances of the Jus-
tices themselves? The facts of Marbury suggest that courts facing 
substantial political pressures and political temptations are likely 
to cloak political considerations in convoluted legal arguments, 
all the while announcing that their duty is solely to say what the 
law is. If so, wouldn't this be relevant in assessing both the merits 
of Marshall's arguments in Marbury and the general principles 
and justifications of judicial review offered therein? 
Indeed, all theories of judicial review that include a place 
for judicial prudence, ranging from Alexander Bickel's embrace 
of the passive virtues28 to Cass Sunstein's call for "minimalist" 
judging/9 clearly must look beyond the four corners of the appel-
late opinion and into the political world in order to determine 
whether cases are properly or improperly decided. That is be-
cause, for a prudentialist, an important part of the work of courts 
is to achieve good consequences through a careful combination 
of judicial assertion and judicial restraint-through knowing 
when to intervene and when to stay aloof, when to goad the po-
litical branches into action and when to avoid creating unneces-
sary strife that risks backlash and reaction. Thus, for a pruden-
tialist, at least, one cannot know whether either Baker v. Carro 
or Roe v. Wade/1 to take two notable examples, is correctly de-
cided without a cool assessment of how the American political 
system would respond to the decision?2 
There is perhaps no better example of this point than Nairn 
v. Nairn,33 in which the Supreme Court dismissed as improvi-
dently granted an appeal from the Virginia Supreme Court 
which had upheld Virginia's anti-miscegenation law. What, pre-
cisely, are the facts of Nairn v. Nairn if they do not include (1) 
the history of massive resistance to Brown v. Board of Educa-
28. Alexander M. Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). 
29. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999). 
30. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
32. On Baker, see, e.g., Robert McCloskey, The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. 
L. REV. 54, 73-74(1962), which expressed great fear that the Court had bitten off more 
than it could chew and would suffer significant political opposition and a potential loss of 
public support. His concerns, of course, turned out to be exaggerated. On the conse-
quences of Roe, see, e.g., MARK G. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION (1996). 
33. Nairn v. Nairn, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749, vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 891 
(1955), reinstated and affd, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849, app. dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 
(1956). 
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tion; (2) the Virginia Supreme Court's open challenge to the 
U.S. Supreme Court through its insistence that, whatever the 
Equal Protection Clause meant, it did not mean that interracial 
marriage would be permitted in the sovereign state of Virginia; 
and (3) the belief by at least some Justices on the U.S. Supreme 
Court that even if the white South would acquiesce in Brown 
through the fig leaf of desegregation with "all deliberate 
speed,"34 it would certainly be moved closer to outright rebellion 
if the Court invalidated something so psychologically sensitive as 
laws prohibiting interracial intimacy?3 If one thinks that pruden-
tial considerations inevitably must play some role in the proper 
exercise of judicial review, then questions of political judg-
ment- and the facts necessary to engage in such judgments- are 
not something to be excluded from legal analysis, but move 
rather quickly to its center. That, of course, leads to a familiar 
criticism of prudential theories- that they blur the lines between 
political and legal considerations, and thus between politics and 
law.36 But the problem persists if one thinks that prudentialism 
should play any role whatsoever in judicial decisionmaking.37 
Similarly, if one is fond of structural arguments, which look 
to how the various branches of government should interact with 
each other, one can hardly avoid considering the political con-
text of Marbury v. Madison. For if one wants to know how the 
branches are likely to interact, one will not find that information 
in Marshall's opinion. Rather, one will find it in the political con-
text that surrounds Marbury and Stuart v. Laird. 
Or consider the "facts" of the Steel Seizure Case, another 
classic separation of powers decision?8 The reader of Justice 
Black's majority opinion will learn only of a labor dispute that 
threatened to shut down the steel industry and of President 
34. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
35. See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, 
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 266-272 (2003). Kennedy writes that "[o]ne unidentified jus-
tice reportedly remarked, 'One bombshell at a time is enough."' /d. at 270. Even more 
interesting, perhaps, is Kennedy's statement, "That sentiment was seconded by Thur-
good Marshall, the chief lawyer for the NAACP, who notably declined to support Ham 
Say Nairn's appeal in the belief that its proximity to Brown v. Board of Education was a 
real detriment." /d. 
36. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1959). A similar objection was offered in Gerald Gunther's classic cri-
tique of Bickelian prudentialism, The Subtle Vices of the 'Passive Virtues' -A Comment 
on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COL. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1964). 
37. See, e.g., Jan Deutsch's classic article, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme 
Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 
(1969). 
38. Youngstown Steel v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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Truman's attempt to avoid this by seizing the mills. The reader 
of Chief Justice Vinson's dissenting opinion, on the other hand, 
will learn that the United States was involved in the first major 
battle of World War III on the Korean Peninsula, and that 
President Truman's action was precipitated by a belief that sei-
zure was necessary in order to protect the safety of American 
troops abroad. One cannot realistically decide the case without 
also deciding which of these sets of facts is relevant. But of 
course, which statement of the facts one finds more relevant, 
will, we strongly suspect, also allow us to predict which rendition 
of the Constitution's grant of Executive power one will prefer. 
But once we concede that the larger political context be-
comes part of the facts of Marbury or Youngstown Steel, or Nairn 
v. Nairn, what is there left to exclude? For example, what about 
the political views of the Justices themselves? Is it one of the 
relevant facts of Marbury that John Marshall was a committed 
Federalist who loathed Thomas Jefferson and feared not only 
that Jefferson would defy any order that Marbury receive a 
commission but also that Jeffersonians in Congress would move 
to impeach him, as, indeed, had already happened with Samuel 
Chase? 39 And if that is a relevant fact of Marbury v. Madison, is 
it appropriate to state, as one of the "facts of the case" of Bush v. 
Gore, 40 that the majority of the Court were committed Republi-
cans who almost certainly preferred a Republican president in 
the White House, and desired that their own successors be ap-
pointed by a Republican rather than a Democrat (especially 
when, as they reasonably believed on December 12, 2000, the 
Senate would also be under Republican control)?41 
Finally, consider whether the facts in Bowers v. Hardwick42 
properly include Justice Powell's stated belief that he had never 
actually met a gay person (although his clerk during the Term 
that Bowers was decided was in fact a closeted gay).43 Should we 
39. Marshall could not know, of course, that Chase would ultimately be acquitted 
and judicial "independence" ostensibly established. 
40. 531 u.s. 98 (2000). 
41. See Sanford Levinson, Bush v. Gore and the French Revolution, LAW & CONT. 
PROB., Summer 2002, at 7, 22 (2002) 
42. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
43. Powell's biographer describes the influences on his decisionmaking in Bowers 
this way: 
Emblematic of Powell's difficulty with this case. and the most puzzling element 
in its history, was the remark that he had never known a homosexual. He said it 
at least twice, once to his clerk and once at the Conference of April 2. Black-
mun later told his clerks that he thought of saying, "of course you have. You've 
even had gay clerks." Instead, Blackmun said, "But surely, Lewis, you were ap-
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consider Justice Powell's history, or equally importantly, his 
stated history of lack of familiarity with homosexuality as a rele-
vant fact of the case? 
Perhaps here, at last, we might be permitted to draw the 
line. The fact that judges or Justices might tend to decide a case 
one way or another because of their political affiliations or fea-
tures of their personal histories may be relevant for purposes of 
historical or political study, but it is not legally relevant. It is not 
relevant to the question of whether the case appeared before the 
Court in a procedurally correct fashion, what the most appropri-
ate rule of decision was, and what the best application of that 
rule to the situation before the Court should have been. The rea-
son it is not relevant to these questions is because in answering 
them we are asked to put ourselves in the position of the judge. 
We take the facts that might (theoretically or hypothetically) be 
available to the judge as potentially relevant (with the caveat 
that in determining the best rule we might want to know facts 
about the future not available to the judge-more about this 
later). We do not, however, treat the judge's personal history, 
politics, or prejudices as part of those facts, because we replace 
the judge's decisionmaking with our own. Thus, the fact that a 
judge was motivated-either politically or personally-to decide 
a case in one way or another is not a relevant fact in our deter-
mination of how the case should be decided. 
Nevertheless, matters are not so simple as that. Although 
we substitute our own judgment for that of the judge, we still 
have to recognize that decisions like the one before us will be 
made by mortal human beings with their own predilections and 
prejudices. Thus, we want to know about Powell's background in 
part because we want to know what we are buying into when we 
allow or forbid judges to articulate the scope of fundamental 
rights in a constitutional system. That is to say, the question of 
the proper exercise of the judicial role-a central issue in Mar-
bury v. Madison itself-is very much bound up with the sorts of 
proached as a boy?" There is no record of a response. 
Was Powell being honest. ... Of course Powell knew homosexuals. The ques-
tion was whether he acknowledged anyone he knew as a homosexual. The an-
swer is that he did not, largely because he did not want to. In his upbringing, 
homosexuality was at least a failing, if not a sin. He later came to think of it as 
an abnormality, an affliction for which its bearers perhaps should not be blamed 
but which was nevertheless vaguely scandalous. He would not make assump-
tiOns. He would not infer such misfortune without direct knowledge. Powell 
would not have known someone was homosexual unless that person told him 
so. 
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR at 528 (1994). 
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persons who become judges, the sorts of conflicts and tempta-
tions that they face and sorts of limitations of experience and 
perspective that they possess.44 
Moreover, we have to take into account the fact that other 
judges will be employing whatever we decide as a precedent in 
later cases, and still others will use the decision as an example of 
what judges are permitted and are not permitted to do. Finally, 
other actors in the political system -like executive and adminis-
trative officials-will have to carry out the decisions, and their 
degree of confidence in the judiciary may be quite important in 
determining the future success of the rule we announce. Put an-
other way, the question of the proper conduct of judges, their 
strengths and limitations, and the proper institutional constraints 
that attend the judicial role are a potential issue in every consti-
tutional case, and indeed, we might suggest, in every legal case. 
So one reason that we might want to know about the conflict of 
interest that Marshall faced in Marbury v. Madison, and that the 
members of the Court faced in Bush v. Gore, is because judges in 
general are constantly facing conflicts and temptations that stem 
from the fact that they have particular backgrounds and political 
views. Moreover, whether or not they succumb to them, other 
people in the constitutional system will be aware of those con-
flicts and temptations and will respond accordingly. 
In fact, one of the interesting consequences of this line of 
argument is that it might lead us to a more general skepticism 
about judicial review. The fact that Powell was clueless about 
homosexuality and that Marshall was a Federalist crony might 
be a reason to keep judges out of the business of judicial review 
altogether. Ironically this might suggest that Bowers, which re-
jected a constitutional challenge to sodomy laws, was rightly de-
cided, and that Marbury, which asserted judicial power to strike 
44. Interestingly, in his dissent in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), Justice 
Powell argued that allegations of systematic bias against Mexican-Americans in jury se-
lection were unfounded because "the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and 
later presided over respondents trial was Mexican American [and] three of the five jury 
commissioners were Mexican-American" Id. at 514 (Powell, J., dissenting). Indeed, Jus-
tice Powell described these facts about the judge and jury commissioners as "critical" to 
the proper resolution of the case. I d. (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justice Rehnquist). His argument, presumably, was that Mexican Americans 
would not discriminate against other Mexican Americans. Justice Marshall disagreed, 
arguing that Mexican-American officials might well hold invidious stereotypes about fel-
low Mexican-Americans. ld. at 503. If Powell is correct that the identity of judges can 
increase our confidence in their resolution of particular cases, there seems to be no good 
reason why such facts might not also diminish our confidence in their ability to judge 
cases fair! y. 
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down laws, was wrongly decided. In the alternative, we might 
think that structural and political restraints should be placed on 
how judges are selected in order to improve the quality of judi-
cial decision. Finally, it might lead us to temper our views about 
judicial review without concluding that the practice should be 
completely abandoned or significantly curtailed.45 
If the question of judicial role and its relationship to politics 
always lurks in the background of judicial decisionmaking, then 
it will not be possible easily to put an airtight boundary on the 
relevant "facts" of a case. Our decision as to what we will count 
as the relevant "facts" in studying the law will rest upon a set of 
pragmatic as well as pedagogical considerations. And one reason 
to supplement the facts as they are usually taught in law school 
courses with other facts about the political and social milieu in 
which a decision occurs is precisely to disturb taken-for-granted 
assumptions about what cases mean and what legal reasoning 
consists in and should consist in. That is part of the reason why 
we have put the facts of Marbury into question, for doing so also 
helps put into question what Marbury really means or should 
really mean. 
In short, questioning what are the "facts" of a particular 
case is yet another way of questioning the legal canon.46 That is 
because, as we have seen, the unconscious categorization of 
which facts are suitable for the legal study of cases is an impor-
tant way that the discipline of law is constituted47 and distin-
guished from other forms of knowledge and other forms of rea-
soning. 
The recitation of relevant facts requires decisions about 
what to leave in and what to leave out. It involves both a selec-
tive contraction and expansion of concern. We cannot list in this 
short essay all of the ways that lawyers and judges engage in se-
lective appraisals of facts in order to establish the boundaries of 
legal reasoning and the perimeters of legal vision. But we can 
identify two large dimensions through which this selective atten-
tion occurs-the horizontal and the temporal. 
The horizontal dimension concerns what roughly contempo-
raneous facts about the social world should count as the relevant 
45. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999). 
46. See J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998). 
47. !d. at 985-87. 
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milieu in which the case appears. The temporal dimension con-
cerns how far back in time, and how far ahead in the future, we 
should look to understand the proper resolution of the case. 
Both dimensions are equally important in producing forms of le-
gal reason that are understood to be separate from politics. And 
both dimensions lead to interesting puzzles and complications as 
soon as we begin to interrogate them. 
The horizontal dimension is implicated when we ask 
whether the political milieu of Marbury should be counted as 
part of the facts of the case. As we have seen in the case of Mar-
bury, expanding our vision to encompass that milieu often helps 
us understand what the legal controversy was really about and 
why people were so agitated about it. But another reason to ex-
pand the facts horizontally is that the political and social milieu 
surrounding a decision may help to legitimate or delegitimate 
the reasoning used in deciding the case. Consider as examples 
Brown v. Board of Education, and the companion case of 
Bolling v. Sharpe,48 which concerned segregation of public 
schools in Washington D.C. 
Could the legal issues in Brown and Bolling really be under-
stood in splendid isolation from the social structures of race rela-
tions in which the controversy over public schooling was embed-
ded? Indeed, could the constitutionality of the segregation of the 
public schools be considered apart from the widespread practices 
of Jim Crow in areas ranging from hotels to funeral parlors, golf 
courses, theaters, bathrooms and water fountains? The great Co-
lumbia legal scholar Herbert Wechsler appeared to think so. As 
he told his audience at the Harvard Law School in 1959,49 five 
years after Brown and well before any significant desegregation 
had occurred in the former Confederate states, the crucial ques-
tion was the relatively abstract one of whether there was any 
neutral principle that could decide between claims for desegre-
gation and the principle of freedom of association. For Wechsler, 
the long and pervasive practice of Jim Crow did not help decide 
this question. He pointed out, somewhat unconvincingly, that he 
was sure that his black colleague Charles Hamilton Houston 
48. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
49. See Wechsler, supra note 36, at 34 (1959): 
For me, assuming equal facilities, the question posed by state-enforced segrega-
tion is not one of discrimination at all. Its human and its constitutional dimen-
sions lie entirely elsewhere, in the denial by the state of freedom to associ-
ate .... But if the freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration 
forces an association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant. Is this 
not the heart of the issue involved ... ? 
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"did not suffer more than I in knowing we had to go to Union 
Station to lunch together during the recess" of Supreme Court 
arguments because it was one of the few places that a black and 
a white man could eat in the pervasively segregated District of 
Columbia.50 Yet, according to Wechsler, neither his sadness, nor 
that of his colleague Houston's, were at all germane to the facts 
relevant to deciding Brown. The daily humiliations visited upon 
Houston, who, after all, lived in Washington, were simply not 
something that a well-trained lawyer should regard as a relevant 
"fact" of the case. 
By contrast, Charles Black, born and raised in Austin, 
Texas, argued that the social structure of America, and its perva-
sive practices of racial subordination, which touched almost 
every aspect of life in the deep South, were the central facts of 
the case in Brown, whether or not those facts appeared in the 
text of Chief Justice Warren's opinion.51 As William Eskridge 
has pointed out, whether one regards these features of American 
society as part of the case depends on what one's conception of 
"law" is. Like many other legal scholars of his generation, 
Wechsler could disregard these features of American society as 
legally irrelevant, indeed, had to disregard them, because he 
"had no vision of 'law' that could fully comprehend or incorpo-
rate this sort of argument."52 
Ironically, it is precisely the history of racial segregation in 
the South and the deep commitment of many of its white citizens 
to preserving an existing racial hierarchy that helps us under-
stand why Chief Justice Warren's opinion does such a remarka-
bly poor job in setting out these facts. Warren's refusal to state 
the facts of the case- the pervasive history of racial discrimina-
tion in the United States from slavery onward-was motivated 
by his desire to avoid enflaming a white South that not only 
50. ld. 
51. "Segregation in the South," Black explained, "comes down in apostolic succes-
sion from slavery and the Dred Scou case." Charles Black, The Lawfulness of 1he Segre-
galion Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,42 (1960). Pretending that segregation was not about 
subordination was folly: 
First, a certain group of people is '·segregated." Secondly, at about the same 
time, the very same group of people, down to the last man and woman, is barred, 
or sou$ht to be barred, from the common political life of the community-from 
all political power. Then we are solemnly told the segregation is not intended to 
harm the segregated race, or to stamp it with the mark of inferiority. How long 
must we keep a straight face? 
ld. at 425. 
52. William N. Eskridge, Public Law From 1he Bouom Up, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 141 
147 (1994). ' 
276 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:255 
benefited from the very system of racial subordination that War-
ren did not dare mention, but also would have to acquiesce in 
the future dismantling of that system of subordination.53 After 
all, Warren himself had written his colleagues on May 7, 1954, 
just ten days before the decisions in Brown and Bolling v. 
Sharpe, that "the opinions should be ... unemotional and, above 
all, non-accusatory. "54 But there is an additional "fact of the case" 
that is central to explaining the particular shape of Warren's opinions. 
It was vitally important that the opinions be unanimous, and this re-
quired the vote of the Kentuckian Stanley Reed, who almost certainly 
disagreed with the Court's decision. It was only late in the process 
that Reed acquiesced in the opinions in Brown and Bolling, an out-
come that would have been most unlikely had Warren denounced the 
South for its gross mistreatment of African-Americans. 55 
In short, deciding what counts as "the facts of the case" in 
this sense helps determine what one thinks should legitimately 
form part of legal reasoning and what features of social life legal 
argument should be permitted to criticize or even allude to. The 
construction of the facts of the case separates those facts that 
well-trained lawyers should regard as relevant to legal reason 
from those features of a situation that the well-trained lawyer 
must regard as legally inadmissible, or, even worse, as actively 
confusing the issue and distracting attention away from the un-
sullied application of law and legal reasoning. In this way, the 
construction of "the facts" is, yet again, another technique in the 
endless effort to separate law from politics and, therefore, to 
postulate and secure the relative autonomy of legal reasoning 
from political considerations. 
The horizontal expansion of the facts of the case also affects 
our judgments as to how and why the Constitution changes. Tak-
ing the political milieu into account helps us see the evolution of 
judicial doctrine not as the isolated decisions of heroic individu-
als but as part of a larger process of changing values among elites 
53. See Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the 1 udicial Opinion, in LAW'S STORIES: 
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 197-99 (Paul Gewirtz & Peter Brook eds., 
1996). As E. Barrett Prettyman, who was clerking for Robert Jackson during the Brown 
term, wrote, "[Warren] had come from political life and had a keen sense of what you 
could say in this opinion without getting everybody's back up. His opinion took the sting 
off the decision, it wasn't accusatory, and it didn't pretend that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was more helpful than the history suggested." Quoted in id. at 198. 
54. ld. at 198 (quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION 58 
(1992)). 
55. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR EQCALITY 698 (1975). 
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and the general population. This helps us see that constitutional 
doctrine evolves both in response and in reaction to larger 
changes in beliefs and attitudes of the general public and policy 
elites, including those elites from whom members of the judici-
ary themselves are drawn. 
Consider, for example, whether the Cold War should be 
treated as part of the facts of Brown, 56 or whether the second 
wave of American feminism is not an ineluctable part of the 
facts of Roe v. Wade7 or Frontiero v. Richardson58 or Craig v. 
Boren.59 The history of a particular time frames a legal decision 
by helping us to understand why people came to believe that a 
legal argument was reasonable or unreasonable, even if it de-
parted markedly from previous doctrine. The Cold War, as well 
as World War II, brought home to many people, and particularly 
foreign policy elites, the need to establish America's bona fides 
as a defender of freedom and equality at home.60 The second 
wave of American feminism changed the minds of (mostly male) 
politicians and judges about what equal citizenship for women 
required. 
Finally, to the extent that one believes in the descriptive re-
ality of something called popular constitutionalism,61 or constitu-
tional protestantism62-i.e., the proclivity of ordinary Americans 
to come to their own conclusions about constitutional require-
ments and to associate with one another in mass movements to 
promote those beliefs-one's view of the "facts" of a case will 
yet again be likely to be very different from that of other ana-
lysts. For a constitutional protestant, the explanation of the 
Court's decision in a particular case like Brown or Romer v. Ev-
ani3 might include the history of social movement contestation 
and political activism that produces a milieu in which courts take 
certain constitutional claims seriously when they did not take 
them seriously before.64 
56. See MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS (2001). 
57. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
58. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
59. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
60. DUDZIAK, supra note 56, at 29-46 (discussion of foreign policy elites), 106-15 
(impact of Brown). 
61. See, e.g., LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (forthcoming 2004). 
62. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 29 (1988). 
63. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
64. Sometimes changes in doctrine reflect the appointment of new persons to the 
bench who signify the strength (and legitimacy) of these social and political movements. 
(Consider m this context Franklin Roosevelt's appointment of avid New Dealers like 
Hugo Black and William 0. Douglas and Felix Frankfurter, the appointment of Thur-
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Returning once again to Marbury, any statement of the 
"facts" of Marbury must include the fact that the person writing 
the decision had been placed there by the leader of that particu-
lar social movement called the Federalist Party as a way of frus-
trating the aims of the newly victorious social movement of Jef-
fersonian Republicanism that would supplant it. That is so even 
though William Marbury did not get his commission, for John 
Marshall would sit on the Supreme Court for many years, pro-
moting the nationalist policies of the party that had secured his 
appointment. Marbury is an excellent example of partisan en-
trenchment, in which members of a political party attempt to 
stock the courts with their allies as a means of promoting their 
constitutional and social policy goals.65 But of course, when we 
say that even the personnel of the judiciary and how they got 
appointed to their positions could be part of the facts of a case, 
we have gone a long way toward changing our expectations 
about what exactly we expect a law student to understand in 
studying the law. That is to say, we have significantly altered 
what the study of law is about. 
The temporal dimension of factual selection is equally sig-
nificant. Just as the law student learns to exclude what happened 
in politics and social life roughly contemporaneously with the 
decision of the case, so too does the student learn, when asked to 
state "the facts of the case," to exclude many things that hap-
pened both before and after a court hands down its opinion, pre-
sumably because these earlier and later features of social life are 
not legally relevant. But it should be abundantly clear that un-
derstanding what a case means, and why it is decided the way it 
is decided often cannot be divorced from these facts. 
This is clearest with regard to "facts of the past." For exam-
ple, what exactly are the facts of The Slaughterhouse Cases,66 the 
Supreme Court's initial construction of the Reconstruction 
Amendments? Do they include merely the fact that New Or-
leans required all butchers to work at a central slaughterhouse? 
Or does understanding the case require something much more? 
For example, should we chastise a student if he or she begins by 
good Marshall to the Supreme Court in 1967, or the appointments of Sandra Day 
O'Connor-the first woman Supreme Court Justice, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who had 
been an activist lawyer on behalf of feminist causes.) 
65. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 25, at 1066-83. See also RAN HIRSCHL, 
TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2003). 
66. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
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noting the fact that the territory of the United States had been 
convulsed in the previous decade by a catastrophic war that left 
two percent of the population dead, to be followed by a remark-
able struggle at both national and state levels over changing the 
Constitution to recognize new juridical realities purchased by the 
blood of the slain Union soldiers?67 And what if an unusually 
well-informed student began his or her recitation by questioning 
the validity of the Fourteenth Amendment itself-pointing to 
the fact that the Amendment passed Congress only because 
Southern representatives and Senators were excluded, and that 
it was ratified by the necessary three quarters of the states only 
because Southern states were denied readmission unless they 
agreed to ratify the document? Would, or should any of this be 
relevant in assessing the Court's initial construction of the Four-
teenth Amendment in Slaughterhouse? 
The problem posed by temporality is pervasive. Consider, 
for example, whether Branch Rickey's 1947 decision to bring 
Jackie Robinson to the Brooklyn Dodgers is not an important 
fact in understanding the Court's willingness to decide Brown v. 
Board of Education in 1954. Even more relevant might be Presi-
dent Truman's willingness to take on the Joint Chiefs of Staff by 
ordering the desegregation of the armed forces, his successful 
reelection in 1948 in a campaign in which civil rights was a major 
issue, and his Justice Department's request in the 1950 case of 
Sweat v. Painte~8 that the doctrine of separate but equal be over-
ruled. 
But these are events quite close in time to 1954. Should we 
expect a student to place the policies of segregation challenged 
in Brown within the context of political events going back at 
least to the Civil War and, in the case of "bloody Kansas," to the 
decade prior to the outbreak of hostilities? Indeed, one might 
reasonably conclude that going back only 100 years is not 
enough. Arguably, a recitation of "the facts" in Brown or, for 
that matter, Plessy v. Ferguson,69 should begin with the arrival of 
the first black slaves in Jamestown, Virginia in 1619. 
Time's arrow, though beginning in the past, flies forward 
into the future. So should we expect a student to be able to recite 
67. We might object to the recitation not because it was irrelevant to understanding 
the case, but because we assume that everyone who has been admitted to law school 
knows the basic facts of the Civil War (although confidence in the latter assumption is by 
no means assured). 
68. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
69. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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the facts of what happened after the Court's decision in Brown 
or Marbury? Understanding what a case means often requires 
recognizing what happened after the decision was entered. This 
is so for two reasons. First, the consequences that the case sets in 
motion often help us understand the practical effect of the case, 
and whether the decision was wise or ill-advised. Second the 
meaning of the case to later generations is produced by the later 
uses and interpretations of it, which continually reframe its 
meaning and significance in our eyes. Thus, Brown v. Board of 
Education has acquired a whole host of meanings in the fifty 
years following the decision: It has become an icon of equality as 
well as a symbol of both what courts can do and what they can-
not do in promoting important public values.70 Perhaps equally 
important, Marbury v Madison has also gained a wide array of 
different meanings, as it has been repeatedly invoked as a sym-
bol of judicial authority, judicial supremacy, and the Rule of Law 
itself. 
Sometimes events following a case put the decision in a very 
different light. When a student studies Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, should the facts of Brown be limited to what happened 
up to the point in which Chief Justice Warren begins his opin-
ions in the case (Brown I and Brown II), or should they include 
the subsequent history of the attempt actually to desegregate the 
public schools, including, in particular, the Topeka, Kansas 
schools? By the end of the twentieth century, public schools in 
the United States were largely de facto segregated by race.71 In 
Topeka itself, the controversy in Brown v. Board of Education 
arose again many years later when residents tried unsuccessfully 
to desegregate that city's public schools.72 
The facts of a given case should, ideally, include both the 
case's beginning and its end. But when, exactly does a case end? 
It is much like Zhou en-Lai's famous comment about whether 
the French Revolution was a success: "It's too early to tell." In 
70. See Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education· A Critical Introduction, in 
WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP 
LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST FAMOUS CIVIL RIGHTS OPINION (2001); 
GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (1991). 
71. ROSENBERG, supra note 70, at 6. See generally JAMES T. PATERSON, BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 
(2001). 
72. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 671 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Kan. 1987), rev'd, 892 F.2d 851 
(lOth Cir 1989), vacated, 503 U.S. 978 (1992), reinstated by: Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 978 
F.2d 585 (lOth Cir. 1992). 
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the same way, perhaps it's too early to know what the end of the 
facts of Brown are, and, we might think, too early to know the 
facts of Marbury-the case in which the Court pronounced its 
constitutional authority to review the constitutionality of federal 
legislation and launched a grand and continuing experiment in 
the use of judicial review in a constitutional democracy. 
The attempt to cut off the facts of Marbury in 1803, like the 
attempt to cut off the facts of Brown in 1954, or even 1955, when 
Brown II is decided, is an attempt to cabin in legal discourse and 
fix those features of the social world that are legally relevant. It 
is not at all clear, however, that the legal meaning of Marbury or 
Brown can be so cabined by eliminating all reference to the 
events that occurred years later. This is especially true if one 
thinks that consequences matter in judicial decisionmaking.73 If 
one reason why we think a legal decision is good or bad is its 
consequences, then, surely, one would think that what actually 
happened later on would be relevant to assessing the cogency of 
the court's analysis.74 
These are only some of the issues at stake in the seemingly 
innocent question, "What are the facts of Marbury?" Indeed, 
there is nothing innocent either in the question or in its answer. 
For the question of what the facts of legal cases are is one of the 
most central- if unacknowledged- issues in shaping the legal 
canon, and thus, in shaping the very discipline of law itself. 
73. See PHILIP BOBBITI, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12·13 (1991), which 
sets out the place of "prudential" reasoning about consequences as among the other le-
gitimate "modalities" of text, structure, history, doctrine, and "ethos." 
74. One might insist that what makes a decision good or bad is not what conse-
quences actually ensue, but what consequences a court might reasonably have predicted 
at the time it handed down its decision. Nevertheless, what actually happens later on may 
change our attitudes about what it was reasonable to have predicted in the first place. 
This is so even granting the obvious dangers of hindsight bias. Moreover, what actually 
happened later on also affects our views about judges' capacities to predict future conse-
quences. If we think that judges are not particularly good at predicting the future conse-
quences of their decisions, we might think twice about placing such confidence in their 
abili.ty to exercise the powers of judicial review fairly and wisely. Consider, for example, 
Just1ce Stevens' statement that Paula Jones' civil suit against President Clinton "appears 
to us h1ghly unhkely to occupy any substantial amount of petitioner's time." Clinton v. 
Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 702 (1997). As Jeffrey Rosen has remarked, this "stands as a daunt· 
ing reminder of the shortcomings of ivory tower judges who fancy themselves to be arm-
chair empiricists." Jeffrey Rosen, Political Questions and the Hazards of Pragmatism, in 
BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 157 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002). 
